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The economics of COVID-19: Initial empirical evidence on how family 
firms in five European countries cope with the corona crisis  
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Victor Tiberius 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – Within a very short period of time, the worldwide pandemic triggered by the 
coronavirus has not only claimed numerous lives, but also caused severe limitations to daily 
private as well as business life. Just about every company has been affected in one way or 
another. This first empirical study on the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on family firms allows 
initial conclusions to be drawn about family firm crisis management. 
Design/methodology/approach – Exploratory qualitative research design based on 27 semi-
structured interviews with key informants of family firms of all sizes in five Western European 
countries that are in different stages of the crisis. 
Findings – The COVID-19 crisis represents a new type and quality of challenge for companies. 
These companies are applying measures that can be assigned to three different strategies to 
adapt to the crisis in the short term, and emerge from it stronger in the long run. In addition, 
the findings show how companies in all industries and of all sizes adapt their business models 
to changing environmental conditions within a short period of time. Finally, the findings also 
show that the crisis is bringing about a significant yet unintended cultural change. On the one 
hand, a stronger solidarity and cohesion within the company was observed, while on the other 
hand, the crisis has led to a tentative digitalization. 
Originality/value – To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first empirical study in the 
management realm on the impacts of COVID-19 on (family) firms. It provides cross-national 
evidence of family firms’ current reactions to the crisis. 
Keywords – Corona, COVID-19, Crisis Management, Family Firms, Strategic Management, 
Business Model Adaptation. 
Paper type – Research paper 
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Introduction 
On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic of the highly 
transmissible coronavirus disease (WHO, 2020) COVID-19, signaling its global spread. Since 
then, the rapid worldwide outbreak of the novel coronavirus has triggered an alarming global 
health crisis. Many countries’ governments have taken measures dramatically affecting the 
daily life of society. To slow down the transmission and spread of the coronavirus, the public 
health tactic of “social distancing” has been widely applied. Regions and even countries have 
been entirely locked down (ranging from contact limitations to full curfew); schools, 
universities and public facilities are shut down; and public events (including sports matches, 
concerts, and even marriages) are currently prohibited in most countries.  
These measures not only affect the populations’ daily life, but have caused significant 
economic consequences in economies around the world. Stock markets have crashed 
dramatically (Baker et al., 2020), with economists consistently forecasting harsh economic 
recessions (Baldwin and Weder di Mauro, 2020; McKibbin and Fernando, 2020). Governments 
have set severe restrictions on firms in various industries, mandated social distancing and 
health protection policies, and even locked down non-essential businesses in many countries, 
triggering simultaneous demand as well as supply side issues (del Rio-Chanona et al., 2020). 
Whereas demand in industries such as healthcare has skyrocketed, demand in industries such 
as restaurants, air transportation, and tourism has evaporated. General buying power and 
consumption in private households have also been affected (Muellbauer, 2020). In just one 
month, 22 million people in the USA lost their jobs, unemployment rates more than doubled in 
Austria, and 29% of all Swiss employees have been placed on short-term furlough (Kurzarbeit) 
due to the crisis. Decreasing consumer demand and spending may even worsen throughout 
2020 with upcoming corporate layoffs and bankruptcies in many affected sectors.  
At the same time, many industries face supply-side issues, as governments curtail the 
activities of non-essential industries and workers are confined to their homes. Businesses here 
need to contend with a number of challenges, including the implementation of required health 
protection measures, reduced production and demand, supply chain disruptions, etc. This 
situation calls for academic research providing firms with valid strategies on how to cope with 
the challenges of the COVID-19 crisis. 
This study explores how and by what means family firms are responding to the COVID-19 
crisis. The majority of business worldwide are family firms, which – depending on the 
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definition applied – comprise approximately 90% of all companies in the countries investigated 
for this study (e.g., Xi et al., 2015). Given their omnipresence in the business landscape, family 
firms’ roles in the economy as employers, wealth creators, and innovators are significant (Filser 
et al., 2016).  
Family firms are typically vulnerable due to their autonomous, family-oriented standing 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Lee, 2006) and their constrained financial capital and resources 
(Kim and Vonortas, 2014; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Moreover, a crisis typically hits the owners 
of family firms twice, i.e. once as private citizens and in a second round as business owners 
(Runyan, 2006). Since the family firm represents the family’s legacy, the effective management 
of crises is critical for family firms, including family SMEs because their socioemotional 
endowment is at stake (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). In addition, family firms show certain 
particularities regarding their behaviors and measures during crises. It has been shown that 
increased family ownership reduces the likelihood that firms follow formal crisis procedures 
(Faghfouri et al., 2015) and that the emotional attachment of the family affects the performance 
of family firms during a crisis (Arrondo-García et al., 2016). Family firms sacrifice short-term 
performance and shareholder value for long-term survival (Lins et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 
2016) and thus may also utilize specific measures in response to crises. Furthermore, family 
firms usually behave more responsibly towards their employees as well as the environment, 
and closely align decisions with the values and non-economic goals of the firm (Chrisman et 
al., 2005; Dyer Jr and Whetten, 2006). And due to their particular ownership structures, family 
firms can make rapid decisions and respond to changes quickly and non-bureaucratically 
(Carney, 2005). 
The practical relevance of family firms and their strategic responses to the COVID-19 crisis 
for this research becomes evident when considering the many examples of family firms 
receiving recent mediai coverage. The German manufacturer of household and commercial 
appliances Miele has scaled down production, decreased operations to minimal levels, and 
implemented decreased working hours as of the beginning of April. The company’s supply 
chain has suffered from a massive disruption, with the company no longer able to acquire parts, 
and unable to sell their products with retail outlets being closed. The Austrian family-owned 
dairy Woerle has attempted to maintain its production to meet the increased demand for cheese 
products while facing new hygiene restrictions and guidelines. Woerle as a result reorganized 
its production, with its operations working day and night, and its employees wearing protective 
masks. The German family-owned developer and producer of microphones and headphones 
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Sennheiser has taken measures in production and marketing to preserve and maintain their 
business relations and activities, including a minimum level of productivity. Production is now 
reorganized into two separately working shifts, working from home has been implemented as 
much as possible, stores have been temporarily closed, and doing business with them is only 
possible on their website. The global Swiss-based logistics company Kühne + Nagel 
International AG has been following its business continuity plans to not only protect their 
employees’ health and safety, but also to ensure uninterrupted service for its clients. Fiat 
Chrysler Automobiles (FCA), part of the Italian multi-industry business dynasty founded by 
Giovanni Agnelli, rapidly announced intensive measures to help fight the spread of COVID-
19 in Italy. The official March 11th, 2020 announcement included the immediate temporary 
closure of its production plants across the country; intensive sanitization of all work and rest 
areas, changing rooms and washrooms; as well as a progressive implementation of “smart 
working” (from home) to “limit social contact as much as possible.” Other examples saw 
family firms’ more creative responses to the crisis. The Italian family-led Giorgio Armani 
Group; the German family-led lingerie manufacturer Mey; Trigema, Germany’s largest 
manufacturer of sports and leisurewear; and the Melitta Group, known for the production of 
coffee filters and vacuum cleaner bags, all have redeployed manufacturing resources to the 
production of medical overalls and face protection masks.  
Despite the academic and managerial relevance of crisis management strategies in general, 
and ways to deal with the COVID-19 crisis in particular, no previous academic studies have 
investigated how and by what means family firms are responding to the COVID-19 crisis. In 
general, only very few studies have investigated how family firms manage and overcome crises 
(for exceptions see Cater and Schwab, 2008; Herbane, 2013; Kraus et al., 2013; Faghfouri et 
al., 2015). The speed with which the COVID-19 crisis has erupted, the immediate health 
hazards for all economic actors, and the strict governmental restrictions around it create a 
unique situation that to date has not been investigated in family business research.  
Against this background, the following attempts to provide the first initial real-time 
“snapshot” evidence of how family firms in five Western European countries (Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland) have responded to the COVID-19 crisis. To 
our knowledge, it is the first empirical study that addresses the consequences and coping 
mechanisms of businesses in the COVID-19 crisis. We further attempt to generate more 
generalizable knowledge about how family firms react and adapt in an unexpected general 
crisis situation. 
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The study contributes to the strategic and crisis management of family firms during the 
COVID-19 crisis, and proposes a model for changes during a crisis for short-term adaption and 
long-term firm positioning. The paper further contributes to family firm research and shows 
how these companies cope with a lockdown situation. Finally, the paper contributes to 
innovation and digitalization research by providing insights into how external shocks may 
trigger firms’ innovation and digitalization processes.  
Situation overview: The COVID-19 crisis 
The origin of the COVID-19 crisis and its spread from China to Europe 
In December 2019, numerous pneumonia cases in Wuhan (in the Hubei Province of China) 
could not be attributed to any known cause (WHO, 2020). The outbreak of the pathogen was 
localized to a regional seafood market in Wuhan, which was closed by local authorities on 
January 1st, 2020 (Huang et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2020), immediately after their declaration of 
an epidemiological alert. At that time, 41 people were already infected (Huang et al., 2020). 
First investigations concluded that the diseases were caused by a novel virus that can be 
transmitted person-to-person (Chan et al., 2020). 
On January 21st, 2020, the WHO published its first situation report on the novel coronavirus, 
outlining 282 confirmed cases in four countries including China (278 cases), Thailand (2 
cases), Japan (1 case), and the Republic of Korea (1 case) (WHO, 2020).  
On January 25th, 2020, the first European cases of the novel coronavirus were published in 
the WHO’s fifth report (WHO, 2020). Subsequently, on January 30th, 2020, after an increased 
spread of the virus in China and its appearance in other parts of the world, the newly-created 
emergency committee declared the new coronavirus a public health emergency of international 
concern (WHO, 2020), as local viral outbreaks could quickly spread worldwide in light of 
today’s international mobility (Cohen, 2000). At that time, 9,826 cases in 20 countries were 
confirmed, including 14 cases in Europe (WHO, 2020). 
On March 11th, 2020, 118,319 cases had been confirmed worldwide, and the WHO director-
general declared the disease COVID-19 a “pandemic” (WHO, 2020), i.e. a worldwide epidemic 
affecting vast numbers of people across borders (Last et al., 2001). 
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Government actions to mitigate the risks of the COVID-19 pandemic 
The declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic clearly emphasized the severe global threat of 
the virus. Table 1 provides an overview of confirmed deaths worldwide for COVID-19, along 
with other infectious diseases. As this disease was the first global threat since the 1918-1919 
outbreak of H1N1 influenza (for which no vaccine or treatment existed (Ferguson et al., 2020)), 
COVID-19 required government action based on mitigation or suppression strategies.  
 
Table 1: Overview of historical diseases (Baldwin and Weder di Mauro, 2020, adapted). 
Mitigation seeks to slow down the spread of a disease and build up herd immunity throughout 
the population. Suppression tries to decrease the reproduction number to <1 through the 
implementation of restrictions until the pathogen can be controlled. However, developing a 
vaccine takes time (Ferguson et al., 2020); although mitigation and suppression can help to 
reduce the spread of something like the new coronavirus, both strategies require drastic 
restrictions with severe impacts on social life and the economy (Anderson et al., 2020). 
Ferguson et al. (2020) modeled the impact of mitigation and suppression strategies on high-
income economies, outlining the importance of five non-pharmaceutical interventions, 
including case isolation at home, voluntary quarantine, social distancing of risk groups, general 
social distancing, and lockdown of schools and universities. Their results show that, regardless 
of the chosen strategy (i.e. suppression or mitigation), multiple non-pharmaceutical 
interventions are necessary to reduce the risk to the health care system posed by the spread of 
the virus. 
The steep increase in infections and the high reproduction numbers in Europe (particularly 
in Italy and Spain) have led governments to implement strict measures to prevent the 
When Epidemic Deaths 
14th Century Bubonic plague 25 million 
1918-1920 Spanish flu 50 million or more 
1981-ongoing AIDS >25 million 
2002-2004 SARS 774 
2009 Avian flu 151,000-575,000 
2014-2016 Ebola >11.000 
2020 Corona/COVID-19 185,500 (as of April 23rd, 2020) 
(Johns Hopkins University) 
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uncontrolled spread of COVID-19. European governments primarily followed the 
recommendations of public health agencies regarding mitigation measures (Baekkeskov and 
Rubin, 2014). These efforts generally aim at keeping the infection “curve” as flat as possible 
to avoid overloading the capacities of the health care system (Lau et al., 2019). It had already 
been demonstrated e.g. in China that strict contact restrictions can significantly reduce the 
number of infections. Their strict curfew, especially in strongly affected regions, has led to a 
significant flattening of the infection curve (WHO, 2020). 
Governments imposed social distancing measures to achieve this goal in Europe (Fenichel, 
2013; Ferguson et al., 2020; Nigmatulina and Larson, 2009). These measures aim to reduce 
avoidable social contacts as much as possible to prevent a rapid spread of the coronavirus. They 
are only regarded as cost-effective for severe pandemics (Pasquini-Descomps et al., 2017). 
Table 2 provides an overview of the non-pharmaceutical interventions the investigated 
countries took to prevent the spread of COVID-19.  
  Austria Germany Italy Liechtenstein Switzerland 
Case isolation at home yes yes yes yes yes 
Voluntary quarantine yes yes yes yes yes 
Social distancing of risk 
groups yes yes yes yes yes 
General social distancing yes yes yes yes yes 
Lockdown of schools and 
universities yes yes yes yes yes 
Closed borders yes yes yes yes yes 
Face masks in closed rooms 
and public transport yes no yes no no 
 
Table 2: Non-pharmaceutical interventions of the countries investigated (as of April 23rd, 
2020). 
The economy during the COVID-19 crisis 
The imposed non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a very negative impact on the 
economy (Anderson et al., 2020; Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007; Lee et al., 2012). Research on 
the economic impact of previous pandemics has shown that countries, industries, and 
companies suffer significantly from the consequences of a global pandemic. This is due to a 
simultaneous demand and supply shock. Demand declines because consumers reduce their 
purchases of non-essential goods and services such as entertainment and travel. And layoffs 
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reduce society’s overall spending capacity (Cahyanto et al., 2016, McKercher and Chon, 2004; 
Sadique et al., 2007). Supply is thrown off course because many firms are simply not prepared 
to deal with the phenomenon of disrupted supply chains (Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). Many 
service and manufacturing sectors as a result have had to shut down their operations (del Rio-
Chanona et al., 2020). 
The COVID-19 crisis has and will have an enormous influence on businesses worldwide. 
Governments across Europe and the US have implemented financial first-aid and stimulus 
packages for businesses. While a few industries such as healthcare have faced increased 
demand and are actually benefiting from the crisis, many industries have been severely 
affected. Governmental restrictions caused the closure of restaurants and hotels, along with a 
very noticeable drop in revenues in the hospitality and tourism industries. In the restaurant 
industry, only food delivery or pickup has been allowed. The closure of leisure activities 
(cinemas, sports facilities, theatres, museums, etc.) has led to severe setbacks in this industry. 
Worldwide landing and birthing bans for aircrafts and ships have created a sharp decline in 
these industries.  
It is already clear that the total state aid, especially in Western countries, will be at levels 
exceeding those of all previous crises. By April 21st, the EU and its member states had tied 
together rescue/stimulus packages worth €3.4 trillion. These enormous measures have been 
taken based on first estimates of economic development; their sums predict a significant 
economic downturn “shaping up as the deepest dive on record for the global economy for over 
100 years” (Harvard economist Kenneth S. Rogoff in the New York Times). 
Event Countries, Year Costs 
Tsunami Japan, 2011 $235 billion 
Hurricane USA, 2005 $81.2 billion 
Earthquake Haiti, 2010 $8 billion 
Tsunami India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, 2004 
$9.5 billion 
Coronavirus Worldwide pandemic, origin in 
China 
Tad 
Table 3: Overview of natural disasters and their costs (Park et al., 2013, adapted) 
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Theoretical foundation 
Organizational crises and crisis management 
Literature on organizational crisis management has taken many different directions in recent 
years. It ranges from different perspectives (finance, accounting, management; Hale et al., 
2005); strategic responses to a crisis (Baron et al., 2005); and handling of employees (Harvey 
and Haines Iii, 2005). Some crisis literature deals with crises caused by companies (Bundy et 
al., 2017), while other literature deals with the effects of natural disasters (Park et al., 2013, 
Runyan, 2006). Researchers have highlighted the overall characteristics of a crisis (Runyan, 
2006). These include surprising changes in a system or to its parts (Greiner, 1989), a threat to 
the organizations’ existence (Witte, 1981), a large amount of involved stakeholders (Elliott and 
McGuinness, 2002), low probability of occurrence and great influence, and little time for 
decision-making (Hills, 1998; Pearson and Clair, 1998).  
Research on the outcome of a crisis deals with different areas such as the changed 
relationship with stakeholders after the crisis (Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 
2008) or the adaptation and learning effects of companies and survival in crisis situations 
(Lampel et al., 2009; Veil, 2011; D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). Crises don’t always have 
only negative implications for stakeholders. Research also highlights the potential positive 
effects of crises and disasters. These situations help to stimulate the innovation approaches of 
companies and identify new markets (Faulkner, 2001). Research shows that management’s 
view of whether the crisis is a threat or an opportunity is of particular importance regarding 
how managers handle the situation. Managers who primarily see a danger in crises usually react 
emotionally and operate with a sense of reduced opportunities in mind. On the other hand, 
crises can also be perceived positively and lead to a flexible and open working approach in 
management (Brockner and James, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 2007; James and Wooten, 2005). 
In general, a crisis can be viewed from an internal and an external perspective. Three main 
process steps apply here: pre-crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-crisis outcomes 
(Bundy et al., 2017). In their recent work, Wenzel et al. (2020) propose four strategic crisis 
responses, which we use as a framework for our analysis: 
1) Retrenchment means that firms take measures to reduce their costs (Pearce and Robbins, 
1993) and complexity (Benner and Zenger, 2016). Both positive and negative consequences 
can emerge from retrenchment. As a direct response to a crisis situation, cost-cutting 
measures have an especially positive effect on maintaining liquidity and providing a solid 
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foundation for long-term recovery (Pearce and Robbins, 1994). On the other hand, 
retrenchment strategies are often attributed to decreased performance (Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997). Especially in the case of long-lasting crises, this strategy ensures a change 
in resource use and company culture (Ndofor et al., 2013).  
2) Persevering focuses on maintaining the firm’s ongoing operations. Stieglitz et al. (2016) 
explain the positive effects of a persevering strategy by the fact that frequent strategic 
changes reduce the value of a strategic renewal. Wenzel et al. (2020) summarize that the 
core of this strategy is not to start a strategic renewal at the wrong time, and that its success 
is linked to the duration of a crisis. The longer the crisis lasts, the scarcer the financial 
resources become. 
3) Innovating focuses on the strategic renewal of the business. A crisis enables companies to 
think openly about new things (Roy et al., 2018). It may even help firms overcome 
organizational inertia and reflect upon the viability of the business model (Ucaktürk et al., 
2011). As firms recognize which parts of their business model are more robust than others 
(i.e. certain product or service lines, particular value creation approaches, or particular 
revenue models, c.f. (Clauss, 2017)), opportunities for business model innovation may be 
identified. Research shows that business model innovation is triggered by external 
developments such as changes in the competitive environment (Clauss et al., 2019), or new 
technologies (Patel and Gigli’s, 2005). Wenzel et al. (2020) summarize that innovating is 
a coping strategy that has sustainable effects and may make the company stronger for the 
future (e.g. for situations where new ways to create revenue are needed). However, low 
liquidity during a crisis is noted by the authors as a limiting factor. Especially as time goes 
by, managers here can miss the chance to make strategic change.  
4) Exit is the last possible reaction if other strategies are deemed unsuccessful. Nevertheless, 
a successful business exit can free up new resources (Carnahan, 2017) and create fresh 
opportunities. Exit in other words can lead to strategic renewal and the foundation of a new 
firm (Ren et al., 2019).  
Family firms during the COVID-19 crisis 
Family ownership reduces the likelihood that firms follow formal crisis procedures (Faghfouri 
et al., 2015). Several particularities may make family firms apt to instead navigate through 
crises based on their focus on family, ownership, and business continuity.  
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Family firms usually have a long-term horizon (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005), intending 
to pass a “clean and sustainable company onto subsequent generations” (Bauweraerts, 2013, p. 
92). Consequently, family members tend to be willing to sacrifice short-term financial gains 
for the long-term survival of their family’s legacy (Lins et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2016). 
Reflecting family firms’ typical long-term orientation (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005), 
Giovanni Agnelli, the patriarch of the Italian multi-industry business primarily known for its 
activities in the automotive industry, and owner of Ferrari, Lancia, Alfa Romeo, and Chrysler 
states, “the [family] company is an inheritance to be protected and handed on. It is the outcome 
of the next and each generation’s commitment to the last” (as quoted in Betts, 2001).  
As a consequence of long-term family ownership, family members are typically emotionally 
attached to their firm (Berrone et al., 2012). This may affect their performance during a crisis 
(Arrondo-García et al., 2016). Further, they tend to build up and maintain long-term 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders, including their employees (Carney, 2005; 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). They behave more responsibly towards their employees 
and their environment, closely aligning strategic decisions with their firm’s values and non-
economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2005; Dyer Jr and Whetten, 2006). As such, family firms 
focus more on the bigger picture and long-term relations and commitments than immediate, 
short-term outcomes. Put differently, family firms tend to be less driven by short-term goals, 
and give priority to the longevity of the family firm (Ward, 1997).  
Family firms also tend to be able to leverage their liquidity, have lower costs of debt 
(Aronoff and Ward, 1995), and build on their so-called patient capital, that is, financial 
resources that can be invested without any threat of liquidation (Dobrzynski, 1993). As a 
consequence, during times like an economic downturn or a financial crisis, family firms can 
better mobilize their resources to maintain their activities, are more resilient (Amann and 
Jaussaud, 2012), and tend to financially outperform non-family firms (van Essen et al., 2015; 
Minichilli et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, crisis situations come along with unexpected challenges that typically require 
fast and decisive strategic decision-making (Heath, 1995; Ritchie, 2004). And yet, family firms 
have always been particularly good at reacting quickly, decisively, and creatively (Ward, 1997) 
to acute situations. Stemming from family firms’ centralized decision-making and their 
owners’ simultaneous stock of ownership, family, and business information, procedures and 
processes are less complicated, and decision-makers can react quickly and discretely focus on 
both firm and the family interests (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). Moreover, owning families 
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influence and control key decision-making processes (Carney, 2005; De Massis et al., 2013), 
which leads to increased strategic flexibility through fewer formalizations and procedures 
(Carney, 2005).  
In this vein, many family firms have responded decisively and quickly to the ongoing 
pandemic by, e.g. implementing preventative measures to mitigate contagion and safeguard 
their business activities for the future to the best possible extent.  
 
Methodology 
We conducted qualitative expert interviews to answer our research questions (Kvale, 1983; 
Neergaard and Ulhøi, 2007) and obtain an “understanding” (Outhwaite, 1975) about family 
firms’ reactions to the COVID-19 crisis. Qualitative research designs are particularly suitable 
for analyzing these kinds of organizational processes (Bluhm et al., 2011; Doz, 2011; Gioia et 
al., 2013; Graebner et al., 2012). Including multiple cases allowed for a robust research 
approach with more generalizable findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2017; Yin, 
2013). 
On the one hand, extensive research on crisis management exists, as seen in the literature 
review. On the other hand, the nature and scope of this pandemic as a specific type of crisis are 
unprecedented. This means that a qualitative methodology is required that can extend existing 
theory (Bansal and Corley, 2012; Bluhm et al., 2011; Brand et al., 2019; Graebner et al., 2012). 
We built on prior research especially by adopting the retrenchment-persevering-innovation(-
exit) framework by Wenzel et al. (2020) as a theoretical lens through which we searched for 
new knowledge (Jacobides, 2005). Both deductive and inductive (Denis et al., 2001; Ferlie et 
al., 2005; Pajunen, 2006), this approach between theory testing and theory generation is in the 
tradition of “theory elaboration” as coined by Lee et al. (1999) and MailTips (2005). 
Employing qualitative interviews enabled us to closely capture family firm owners’ and 
managers’ subjective experiences during the pandemic (Graebner et al., 2012). As we searched 
for specific and ad-hoc rather than standardized and established reactions to this crisis, the 
interviews added vividness, concreteness, and richness to the research phenomenon (Bluhm et 
al., 2011; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Graebner et al., 2012). 
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Sample 
We employed a purposive sampling technique (Guest et al., 2006; Morse et al., 2002), 
interviewing key informants such as top management team members (e.g. CEOs or COOs) or 
the responsible area managers (Lechner et al., 2006). This approach allowed for maximum 
variation, following the principles of appropriateness and adequacy (Gaskell, 2000; Seawright 
and Gerring, 2008). We were able to gain insights regarding both similarities and contrasts 
among the cases (Guest et al., 2006). The respondents represented family firms located in 
Austria, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. 
As is common in qualitative research, the data analysis started directly after each interview 
until saturation was reached after 27 interviews, i.e. further data collection did not generate 
new insights (Boddy, 2016; Eisenhardt, 1989; Guest et al., 2006; Morse et al., 2002). Table 4 
provides an overview of the respondents’ and their firms’ characteristics. 
 
Respondent Country 
No. of 
Employees 
Industry 
Year of 
foundation 
Informant’s 
Position 
R1 AT 50 
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
2017 COO 
R2 AT 5 Other Service Activities 2001 CEO 
R3 ITA 8 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
1975 CEO 
R4 GER 1400 Manufacturing 2012 CEO 
R5 GER 45 
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
1949 CEO 
R6 GER 3800 Manufacturing 1873 CEO 
R7 ITA 100 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1851 CEO 
R8 GER 700 Manufacturing 1921 CEO 
R9 ITA 1200 Manufacturing 1965 CEO 
R10 ITA 7 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
1984 
Head of 
Sales 
R11 GER 415 Financial and Insurance Activities 1948 CEO 
R12 CH/FL 8 Financial and Insurance Activities 1995 CEO 
R13 CH/FL 5 
Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
2018 COO 
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R14 CH/FL 3 
Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
2017 CEO 
R15 AT 40 Manufacturing 1996 
Head of 
Sales 
R16 ITA 50 Manufacturing 1986 
Head of 
Marketing 
R17 GER 1000 Transportation and Storage 1903 CEO 
R18 AT 15 Other Service Activities 1976 CEO 
R19 GER 1700 Manufacturing 1984 CEO 
R20 GER 200 Manufacturing 1745 CEO 
R21 GER 70 Manufacturing 1958 CEO 
R22 ITA 100 Manufacturing 1965 CEO 
R23 ITA 331 Manufacturing 1945 
Head of HR 
& member 
of the board 
R24 AT 107 Other Service Activities 1964 CEO 
R25 AT 12 Information Technology 2016 CEO 
R26 CH/FL 8 Other Service Activities 2009 CEO 
R27 AT 3 Real Estate Activities 2003 CEO 
Table 4: Overview of interviewed companies 
 
Data collection 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with the respondents between March 26th and April 
10th, 2020, i.e. during the current peak of the crisis in the countries under investigation. These 
were based on an interview guide which allowed the interviewers to spontaneously react to the 
respondents’ statements (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Guest et al., 2006; Neergaard and 
Ulhøi, 2007). Due to the social distancing measures or even general quarantine, the interviews 
were conducted by telephone and the digital communication tools Skype, Zoom, and Loop Up. 
The interviews were recorded with the respondents’ consent, lasting on average 35 minutes. 
 
Data analysis 
The interviews were transcribed word for word, ignoring special linguistic and phonetic 
characteristics such as slang and gap fillers (“uh”, “hmm”, etc.) to focus on the interview 
content alone. We independently read the transcripts and coded the data in an open manner 
(Miles et al., 2014; Corbin and Strauss, 2014) to determine how family firms were affected, 
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the specific measures family firms take, and which additional changes within the firms emerged 
due to the COVID-19 crisis. We iteratively analyzed the data until common themes emerged 
and could be verified through feedback loops. To ensure reliability and validity of the findings 
(Kirk et al., 1986; Morse et al., 2002; Sousa, 2014), we read and coded the data independently 
and compared, discussed, and revised our codes iteratively before we consolidated them. 
Regarding the measures firms took, we used Wenzel et al.’s (2020) framework to categorize 
them as retrenchment, persevering, or innovation measures and as short- or long-term oriented. 
We did not find examples of exit strategies. 
Findings 
Overview 
Our interviews showed that not all companies are affected equally by the COVID-19 crisis, 
and that the different timings in the respective countries did not create significant differences. 
In addition, a marked difference between large and small family firms was seen. The issue of 
liquidity was much more important for large than for small companies. Although liquidity is in 
fact relevant for the latter, the topic took up significantly less time in the interviews and was 
less directly addressed by the interviewees. 
The analysis of our interview data from the 27 interviews led to a number of key insights 
when respondents talked about their family firm’s reaction to the COVID-19 crisis. These can 
be subsumed under five overarching topics which form the main focus of the following analysis 
and results presentation:  
1. Safeguarding liquidity 
2. Safeguarding operations 
3. Safeguarding communication 
4. Business models 
5. Cultural changes 
 
Safeguarding liquidity  
Liquidity safeguarding emerged as one of the key issues during the crisis. Only two 
interviewees did not address the issue at all (R25, R11). While the topic was only casually 
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addressed in small companies, it comprised a large part of the interview time in many large 
companies.  
The topic had very different significance in the interviews. For a number of family firms, 
liquidity has not been a major issue so far (R12, R16, R19, R23, R26), as they can even reinvest 
profits (R7) and are prepared for these kinds of situations: “As a company in the financial 
sector, we are experienced in crises and assume that they will always come around. We are 
prepared for this and have sufficient liquidity to get through a prolonged crisis” (R12). Others 
have just started to or already implemented specific measures to ensure liquidity (R1, R4, R6, 
R14), such as taking advantage of state aid measures and reducing fixed costs. 
The governments in which our study took place have taken numerous measures to limit the 
crisis’s economic consequences as much as possible, including financial support for 
companies. In addition to direct subsidies, these measures include shortened work hours and 
the repayment of income tax. Out of 27 interviewed family firms, 11 are using reduced-hour 
working models in particular (R1, R2, R4, R5, R10, R13, R15, R17, R20, R23, R24). 
The family firms we talked to also started discussions with stakeholders, including 
employees, landlords, and banks, to identify the potential for reducing their fixed costs. For 
many, personnel costs and rent are important cost units which need to be reduced to ensure 
liquidity. Layoffs were rarely mentioned by the family firms as a measure used during the early 
phases of the COVID-19 crisis. Instead, they relied on their employees and their commitment 
to the firm to find possibilities to reduce fixed costs. As one CEO described: “We used an 
intensified interaction with employees to ask them about cost-saving potentials. This gave us a 
list of cost drivers that have not been used for a long time. The employees have clearly helped 
to reduce the costs of the company” (R17). Other family firms are cutting back on and 
postponing investments (R1, R21). 
Safeguarding operations 
Although the mitigation of the transmission risk of COVID-19 within the company is a major 
goal for the interviewed family firm owners/managers, they simultaneously highlighted the 
need to safeguard their operations, at least to a certain degree. As social contacts within the 
firms had to be reduced as much as possible, family firms have allowed and supported working 
from home, and closed social meeting points. They additionally have taken advantage of free 
office space, and reorganized operations into two shifts. 
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Most family firms have implemented work from home and supported their employees in 
equipping their home offices, purchasing extra smartphones and laptops (R11) or computer 
monitors (26). Nevertheless, a few firms were not willing or able to allow for work from home 
(R5, R13, R14, R16, R17, R19, R23), most notably those employees that work with special 
infrastructure. This situation mainly affected companies in the production and hospitality 
sector. To reduce social contacts within offices, companies closed meeting points like 
cafeterias or coffee machines (R6) and encouraged their employees not to eat in groups (R18). 
Furthermore, firms created more distance among the individual employees by using their 
existing space in the best possible way (R6, R8, R18, R20): “We have converted our meeting 
rooms into offices. They are not needed at the moment anyway” (R18). While shift work is 
generally widespread in production departments, this form of work is in fact often new in 
administration, with some companies implementing shift work throughout all segments of their 
operation to prevent the spread of the disease (R6, R19, R21). This organizational change has 
created a minimum level of flexibility in the organization. 
In order to be able to continue to run the company in the best possible way, some companies 
have set up crisis teams or restructured the management (R11, R15, R20) so that the necessary 
competencies for overcoming the crisis are clearly distributed: “We have defined four 
necessary areas and assigned each to a responsible person” (R15). However, this distribution 
of competencies wasn’t only observed at the management level. In one company, a deputy was 
appointed for each management task in order to immediately have the best possible 
replacement in case of illness (R20).  
The crisis is also showing effects and potential for change on the ownership level. Although 
the current situation calls for quick decisions, the management of a company feels significantly 
restricted. With many important decisions, care must currently be taken to ensure that the 
majority of the owners support them. On a related note, some owners find it perfectly 
acceptable for owner meetings to take place (R8). 
Safeguarding communication  
The interviews showed that safeguarding communication is important for keeping mutual 
interactions with employees, customers, and suppliers going despite social distancing. When it 
comes to employees and COVID-19, two central fears are at the heart of employees’ worries. 
First, they fear the disease caused by the novel coronavirus and its consequences for their 
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family and friends. The managing director of a large family firm (R6) for instance described 
this fear as follows: “The first corona case in the company led to the employees packing their 
things within 10 minutes and going to their home office. Some even unplugged their PCs and 
installed them at home.” Second, employees fear for their jobs, as the COVID-19 crisis is likely 
to have economic consequences for their firms (R1, R5). 
Most interview partners addressed these fears through intensive and proactive 
communication with their employees. The frequency and way of doing this varies among the 
companies. Reaching all employees meant the family firms proactively used a number of ways 
of communication because not all employees have access to the intranet of a company or their 
own e-mail address. Here they provided FAQs on their web sites (R6), while others officially 
communicated with their employees using regular mailings (R12), WhatsApp messaging (R8, 
R18), an information blog or podcast (R4), a service hotline (R20), or a daily employee 
newsletter written by the CEO in a very personal style (R19): “I write a letter to my employees 
every day about the current situation. This goes far beyond the economic aspect. I am also 
addressing personal issues very strongly here.” 
This increased need for communication seemed particularly challenging within larger 
family firms with more complex organizational structures and employees. Here, owners have 
suddenly observed that existing information flows are no longer simple for several reasons. 
First, the implementation of work from home and shortened work hours is completely new to 
many of the interviewed firms (R8, R17). It is now more difficult than ever to reach their 
employees and diffuse critical information among all internal stakeholders.  
In this situation, some firms communicate with the department heads first, who then pass 
on the information to their employees: “We have online meetings with our department heads, 
and they inform the employees using WhatsApp” (R8). Other companies communicate directly 
and on a very regular basis with employees, generating unexpected advantages (R17), with the 
employees suggesting possible cost reductions to the CEO, often mentioning that they have in 
fact addressed their respective issues before, but that they never reached the CEO.  
Due to the changes emerging from firms’ operations safeguarding and governments’ non-
pharmaceutical interventions, communication with customers only takes place via digital 
communication channels. Typically on-site customer contacts have now shifted to the digital 
world while contacts with new customers are even more difficult and sometimes no longer take 
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place at all. Interviewees (R2, R20, R25, R26) pointed out that initial contact and confidence 
building with customers will probably continue to take place on a personal level in the future. 
The general acceptance of digital communication has increased, even among more late-
adopting customers.  
The interview partners pointed out several advantages of digital meetings: better scalability 
for digital workshops (R25), easier to get the necessary experts into the call than directly to the 
customer (R15), enormous potential to save time considering the fact that not all meetings are 
actually necessary (R20). The CEO of a larger enterprise (R20) has to travel to Singapore on a 
regular basis and plans to reduce these trips now: “I spend so much time on the plane getting 
there, and the jetlag also has a negative effect on my work. I really appreciate the digital 
meetings.”  
Business models 
The respondents presented different scenarios in this category. Eight family firms (R1, R5, R9, 
R14, R20, R24, R25, R26) stated that they had already started to change or extend their existing 
business models because of the COVID-19 crisis. Although one of them has lost more than 
80% of its typical revenue streams, it has taken advantage of the high demand for toilet paper, 
using their vacant premises to sell it (R5). A clothing company identified mask production as 
an opportunity and changed its production accordingly (R9). Business model adjustments also 
play a role for companies that continue to be successful during the crisis with their existing 
models. Due to the greater flexibility of customers, a family firm used the possibility to 
digitalize their workshops (R25). Another company started to include only digital meetings in 
its standard prices and charge additional costs for on-site support and workshops (R26). 
One company (R8) felt significantly strengthened by the initiated change and therefore 
continued to adhere to it. A second group of family firms (R1, R5, R11, R13, R17, R23, R27) 
started to think about new business models, although for several reasons, these have not yet 
been implemented. The COO of one company (R1) explained this situation: “Our daily 
business is greatly reduced, so we have free time that we can use for strategic discussions.” A 
group of three family firms (R1, R5, R20) have already made initial changes directly and were 
planning long-term changes as well. It was noticeable that both companies from the hospitality 
sector have implemented new business models in the short-term to keep some revenue streams 
going, while working on further concepts in the long-term to diversify their company and 
reduce risks. 
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A total of seven companies (R2, R3, R7, R10, R16, R22, R23), mainly in Italy (six of these 
seven), have not changed anything to date. They are however aware that if the situation does 
not improve within the next one to three months they will have to change their overall strategy. 
One final group of seven companies did not think about changing their business model or 
general strategy. They are planning to push through this crisis, as a CEO of an automotive 
supplier said: “We will not adapt our business model. We have to navigate through the crisis 
because we have just made a lot of investments in electric mobility” (R4). 
Cultural change 
A major point repeatedly touched upon in the interviews was cultural change. This takes place 
mainly in two sub-categories. On the one hand, the crisis is creating a strong sense of solidarity 
among employees and suppliers, and on the other hand, there is strong pressure to digitize. The 
CEO of a company with over 1700 employees described the situation with the following 
sentence: “It is unbelievable and it really leaves me speechless how this strengthens the 
cohesion” (R19). Another CEO emphasized above all the issue of digitalization through 
cultural change: “There is a noticeable cultural change. Even older employees cannot deny the 
digital opportunities” (R6). 
The topic of strengthened solidarity was present in almost all the interviews in Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein (R1, R4, R6, R8, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15, R19, 
R20, R21, R25, R26, R27). One Austrian firm for instance makes all decisions based on the 
employees’ interests, first and foremost striving for employee solutions (R1). 
In Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein, family firms’ CEOs were fascinated 
by the employees’ solidarity and commitment to the company. Employees’ commitment is 
manifesting itself through increased motivation, teamwork, cohesion, and team spirit (R4, R6, 
R12, R14, R19, R20, R21, R26, R27) guided by the vision of facing this crisis together (R8, 
R12, R15, R21). Also, employees are showing an understanding for the exceptional measures 
taken by the family firms to safeguard liquidity and operations, including shortened work hours 
(R21) as a means to safeguard the firms’ survival. One CEO of a company that is affected by 
seasonal changes and is fully booked at the moment stated: “We are currently in a special 
situation. We have a lot of work to do. The staff approached me to suggest that we work through 
the Easter holidays” (R19). In another company, employees are trying to create new ideas and 
identify potential for the company to survive and get stronger: “Our employees all think 
individually about how they can help the company to keep the jobs” (R20).  
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In many companies, the effects of the crisis are leading to a strong push for digitalization. 
The cultural perspective in particular is being emphasized by the companies. One interviewee 
described the situation as follows: “We have had the technical possibilities for a long time. But 
they haven’t been used a lot. Now the employees are using the tools” (R6). Another interviewee 
that manages 50 employees in restaurants and bars supported this statement: “The crisis 
encourages even the cook, who still does orders by hand, to use digital tools” (R1). The CEO 
of a medium-sized company that produces lights for malls described the quick change in the 
organization to digital tools: “For us, the crisis is a kind of forced digitalization” (R21). In 
total, 15 of all 26 interview partners mentioned the topic of digitalization. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our paper represents the first empirical study in the management field providing initial 
evidence of the economic impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on family firms in five 
Western European countries. Based on a sample of 27 family firms, our findings contribute to 
three main research streams: 
First, they contribute to the fields of strategic management and crisis management by 
integrating our findings into the proposed crisis responses of Wenzel et al. (2020). Our findings 
not only support but also advance the authors’ proposed categorization of strategic responses 
in crisis situations, showing that these strategies are rarely applied on their own, but instead are 
combined by using a set of different interventions. Second, contributing to family firm 
research, we point out family firms’ sense of securing liquidity and solidarity. Third, in the 
context of innovation and digitalization, we highlight the current crisis’ impact on strategic 
changes in business models and the operational use of digital tools as well as the (positively) 
forced culture of digitalization. This last point also provides another insight, i.e. the distinction 
between planned changes initiated by the company and unintended changes as a result of the 
crisis. 
Contribution 1: Strategic Management and Crisis Management 
Our analysis shows that family firms follow different approaches to deal with a crisis. These 
different strategies can be traced back to the varying starting situations of the companies. The 
decisive factor seems to be above all the firms’ sector, which dictates the degree to which the 
firms are affected by the health crisis. Firm size also appears to play a significant role. Some 
firms are hardly affected at all, and yet still follow a strategy of crisis management that goes 
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far beyond persevering. Here we see that the entrepreneurial orientation of the management 
team helps to see the situation as a business opportunity. 
Our empirical findings can confirm and extend the crisis response strategies of Wenzel et 
al. (2020). We particularly respond to their call for more work on crisis management strategies 
in the COVID-19 crisis, as we substantiate these with the actual portfolio of coping 
mechanisms utilized in the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis. Our research identified various 
mechanisms that can be related to three of the four crisis management strategies. We did not 
find an exit case in our interviews, which may be due to the early phase of the crisis.  
In contrast to the more separate strategies described by Wenzel et al. (2020), our findings 
highlight how most companies utilized a combination of different coping mechanisms directly 
after the crisis started (Table 4). In the empirical context, each of the three strategies was 
illustrated by several operational measures which are mostly combined. Persevering is the only 
strategy used as a single strategic response to the crisis. Eight companies are following this 
strategy, and are mainly waiting for the situation to change. What these companies have in 
common is that they already had sufficient liquidity before the crisis, and therefore did not 
require cost-saving measures. In addition, some of the companies will need to make strategic 
changes in the future if the crisis lasts longer. This behavior fits the statement by Wenzel et al. 
(2020), noting that persevering is a good strategy, although if the crisis lasts too long, it cannot 
be pursued further.  
Strategic Response Number of Companies 
Pure Retrenchment None 
Pure Persevering 8 
Pure Innovation None 
Retrenchment + Persevering 6 
Retrenchment + Innovation 1 
Persevering + Innovation 6 
Retrenchment + Persevering + Innovation 6 
Table 4: Combination of measures of strategic responses 
The adjustments made in the companies have both short-term and long-term consequences 
and were usually made for two reasons. The first reason is safeguarding liquidity in the crisis. 
The second reason is to improve the long-term survival and viability of the company. Because 
not one single generic strategy might be suited to address both objectives simultaneously, the 
mixed strategies of family firms in our study may describe an “ambidextrous crisis 
management” (Schmitt et al., 2010). On the one hand, these companies have kept operational 
daily business alive and secured the jobs and liquidity of the business by handling the existing 
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operations accordingly. On the other hand, they simultaneously have started to explore 
opportunities for long-term strategic changes that may secure the survival and viability of the 
firm. 
Based on the integration of the interview findings into the paper of Wenzel et al. (2020), we 
propose a model (Figure 1) of strategic responses that family firms may utilize during a crisis 
situation from a short-term to a long-term perspective. This combination results in a matrix 
which, on the one hand, takes up the response strategies from the existing literature and, on the 
other hand, considers temporal perspectives. The model is based on six fields within which 
firms can react.  
 
 
Figure 1: Model of short-term and long-term interventions. 
 
One major intervention during a crisis is the controlled shutdown. Here a family firm 
reduces fixed costs and safeguards liquidity. Practical examples are the implementation of 
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shortened work hours. Although family firms cannot stay in the locus of a shutdown long-term, 
they can however engage in process streamlining, reducing unnecessary complexity within the 
organization and identifying inefficiencies (Benner and Zenger, 2016). 
Every crisis brings specific managerial challenges (see Bundy et al., 2017) that are 
combined in operative crisis management. These challenges have to be addressed to allow the 
family firm to maintain the status quo. In general this involves the creation of a separate team 
to handle the crisis, and in the specific pandemic situation involves social distancing. Once the 
low point of a crisis has been overcome, it is important for companies to start a reflection, 
training their employees to adapt processes based on what they learned during the crisis; this 
process additionally includes organizational learning (Wang, 2008). 
In the short run, family firms engage in temporary business model adjustment because they 
only can react within their existing business model and strategy (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart, 2010). Despite this limitation, they can in fact identify opportunities based on the 
changed environment the crisis creates, altering or adapting their business model for a period 
of time to exploit these opportunities. Examples here include producing masks or changing 
from a classic dine-in restaurant to food delivery. In the long run family firms engage in 
business model innovation to overcome a crisis and create a more sustainable foundation for 
the future, making a change to the strategy necessary. While the temporary business model 
adjustment is basically only new to the firm and not to the industry, the business model 
innovation in the long run can be more complex (see Foss and Saebi, 2017).  
This study provides first insights into the six crisis interventions and their bundles of 
measures. These packages of measures should however be further reconsidered. Due to the 
timing of the study, they may still change significantly if/as the crisis goes on. Companies 
furthermore have a different view of the situation after a crisis. Another possibility is to 
research combinations of strategies. In this case, only persevering was pursued as a single 
strategy. Research will have to show whether this is an exception to this situation. A focus here 
should be on research into the medium- to long-term change and adaptation of the strategies. 
The question arises whether companies that provide information on their strategies during the 
crisis will continue to pursue the same strategies after it is over. 
Contribution 2: Family Firm Research 
Focusing on family firms and how they are affected by the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, we 
identify several special features of family firms’ crisis reaction. First, we find that family firms’ 
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typical long-term orientation (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) manifests itself in a strong 
focus on liquidity safeguarding. Although liquidity safeguarding represents an important issue 
while facing the COVID-19 crisis for all family firms, not all currently suffer from severe 
liquidity problems. This is in line with prior literature proposing that, even during crisis 
situations, family firms benefit from their controlling families’ financial support to secure 
investments and employment in the case of reduced market demand and competitiveness 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2010). The firms suffering from liquidity problems during the early 
phases of the current COVID-19 crisis preferred to use state support and reduced their fixed 
expenses, including personnel costs, rent, and investments. This reaction may be explained as 
the COVID-19 crisis in contrast to e.g. the financial crisis of 2008 is impacting both the demand 
and supply sides simultaneously (del Rio-Chanona et al., 2020), limiting the opportunities for 
family firms to safeguard liquidity on their own. 
Existing literature and prominent media examples (e.g., FCA) show that family firms may 
react faster in crisis situations than their non-family counterparts (de Vries, 1993; Ward, 1997). 
Our investigation however finds that this does not necessarily have to be the case in all family 
firms, and that family ownership is not always a pure advantage. Family firms in particular 
with a large number of shareholders and external directors may end up in greater trouble than 
non-family firms in crisis situations as family owners’ interests may diverge from those of non-
family managers (Mustakallio et al., 2002). Family settings often do not provide the 
opportunity for digital meetings everywhere, even though during times when social distancing 
is a legal requirement, larger meetings cannot be held in any other setting. From this arises the 
question about (1) whether the rapid decision-making abilities of families apply to companies 
in all constellations, (2) which portion of shareholders’ decisions are significantly slowed down 
or otherwise impacted, and (3) what consequences external managers have.  
 Our findings also reveal family firms’ extraordinary solidarity with employees as well 
as external stakeholders facing this crisis. The investigation clearly shows that family firms 
count on their employees to overcome the crisis period together and support them in facing the 
COVID-19 crisis. Family firms seek to make sure that employees can work efficiently at home, 
i.e. by means of equipment purchases, while also emphasizing the importance of personal and 
frequent communication and interaction with employees. This strong sense of belonging and 
commitment can help companies to overcome employee conflicts and avoid turnover in the 
long run (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
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Contribution 3: Innovation and Digitalization 
Our findings support previous research (e.g. Archibugi et al., (2013), Seeger at al., (2005)), 
showing that external shocks may trigger adaptation and innovation by organizations.  
The findings of our study point to two mechanisms that foster the adoption of digital tools 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). First, the situation and restrictions make personal interaction 
impossible and force even late-adopting employees and managers of family firms to adapt to 
new digital workflows and technologies (e.g. virtual meeting technologies). Second, this forced 
adaptation allows the opportunity to prove a technology’s functionalities and advantages and 
may therefore convince previously resistant employees of the benefits of digital technologies 
in daily business. As this individual conviction spreads into a company, cultural changes that 
were often described as necessary but difficult to achieve for digital transformation in 
incumbent firms get rolling (e.g., Warner and Wäger, 2019). The pure use of digital 
technologies changes the way employees think, and allows family firms to identify new and 
unexpected strategic opportunities (Nambisan et al., 2017; Tilson et al., 2010). 
Previous studies have shown that changes in the environment are a determinant of business 
model innovation (e.g. Clauss et al, 2019). We provide two explanations for this previously 
identified effect. First, in situations where the short- and long-term survival of the firm is at 
stake, companies need to find creative ways to utilize their core competences, even stretching 
the boundaries of their established business model (e.g. producing face masks instead of 
clothing). Second, freed-up resources and the organizational breathing space created as a result 
might suddenly give companies the opportunity to reassess their established business model 
and engage in strategic business planning. 
Moreover, our findings highlight a higher acceptance of digital communication on the 
customer side. Companies are expecting a drastic reduction in travel (even though some expect 
this to not last long). Therefore, the time should be used to show customers on short notice the 
benefits of digital communication such as virtual meetings and the involvement of several 
experts simultaneously when attending them. Research even shows that one of the outcomes 
of a crisis is a changed relationship with stakeholders (Coombs, 2007; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
We suggest an investigation of whether the initial discussion of a business model innovation 
during a crisis will lead to its actual implementation in the long run. Further research projects 
should examine the developmental status of the intended innovation over time and show 
whether the firms that claim to innovate their business model actually implement this.  
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Managerial Implications 
The findings of this study provide important and timely implications for family firm owners 
and managers. Family firms can follow the model developed to respond quickly and efficiently 
to a crisis. The aim is not only to survive the crisis, but also to emerge from it stronger. 
 
Figure 2: Specific measures to address during the crisis. 
 
In a first step, companies must ensure liquidity, reducing their costs and using shorter 
working hours or other government support. These short-term effects should be extended by 
identifying inefficiencies in the company, which can also help achieve long-term effects. The 
companies we studied above all are applying the ideas of employees in this situation to quickly 
achieve a cost reduction. 
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Family firms that have the opportunity to continue operating in the wake of the crisis should 
take advantage of this opportunity and create the appropriate framework conditions. This 
includes situation-specific adjustments which, in the case of COVID-19, above all enable social 
distance and ensure improved hygiene. In addition, communication with employees plays an 
essential role. Employees want to have their fears calmed, and need to be kept informed about 
the ongoing situation. From a long-term perspective, continuing education is a key factor. If 
financial means are available, free time for employees can be used to hold further training 
without hindering the employee in his or her operational tasks. 
In addition to these safeguards for ongoing operations, family firms also take advantage of 
short-term opportunities and adapt business models. For many companies, crises provide these 
opportunities for adjustment. Innovations can also be external (Chesbrough, 2020). These 
include the numerous companies that now produce medical protective clothing or restaurants 
that are creating new ideas to continue generating sales. Short-term opportunities may also give 
rise to long-term ones. Therefore, companies should be thinking now about the long-term 
effects of the crisis and the potential business models that will emerge in the future. One main 
focus of these long-term considerations is to improve the company’s resistance to crises. 
Limitations and Future Research 
27 family firms in a total of five countries were qualitatively examined in the context of this 
study. The study design was carefully selected to objectively evaluate the findings. Despite its 
important early contribution to business research and management in the realm of the COVID-
19 crisis, our exploratory study only provides preliminary findings. It will hopefully trigger 
future studies that investigate their underlying mechanisms and procedures as well as the 
consequences of the coping mechanisms identified here. We look forward to a multitude of 
subsequent further research on the specifics of this crisis.  
We encourage future research that investigates how family managers as well as the business 
families related to the firm perceive and assess the current as well as any crisis situation, and 
how decision-making about coping mechanisms is utilized in various family situations. We 
particularly consider this an important research area, with one interviewee mentioning that if 
there are serious conflicts in the family, handling a crisis becomes a nightmare.  
Due to the fact that this study took place immediately after the onset of the crisis, and that 
it cannot be said at this time which companies will emerge stronger from it, it is not possible 
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make conclusion about the success of the coping mechanisms and crisis management strategies 
described. The special situation and time in which this study was created leaves open a 
comparative assessment of the usefulness of these mechanisms. Large-scale empirical 
assessments may be suited to continuing this research effort. Due to the forecasted enormous 
long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis, our study should be followed up with longitudinal 
analyses to investigate the long-term strategic responses of family firms to it.  
We finally would like to encourage researchers to do further studies in other countries as 
well to achieve a global picture of the outcomes.  
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